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NOTE
ASSURING FAIRNESS IN CORPORATE MERGERS:
RECENT STATE TRENDS
The recent corporate phenomenon of "going private"' has resulted in
concern on the part of legal commentators2 and the judiciary3 as to whether
new or traditional standards should be applied to regulate majority share-
holder actions designed to eliminate equity interests of minority sharehold-
ers. As a result of the recent Supreme Court decision in Santa Fe Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Greene,I the law governing going private transactions and
"Going private" broadly encompasses any corporate transaction resulting in the ac-
quisition of all publicly held common stock. Note, Going Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Going Private]; see text accompanying notes 12-22 infra.
2 See, e.g., Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rav.
987 (1974)[hereinafter cited as Borden]; Greene, Corporate Freeze-Out Mergers: A Proposed
Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1976)[hereinafter cited as Greene]; Vorenberg, Exclusiveness
of the Dissenting Stockholder's Appraisal Right, 77 HAay. L. REV. 1189 (1964)[hereinafter
cited as Vorenberg]; Going Private, supra note 1.
3 See, e.g., Green v. Santa Fe Indus., Inc., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S.
462 (1977)(see note 4 infra); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); Berkowitz v.
Power/Mate Corp., 132 N.J. Super. 35, 342 A.2d 566 (Ch. Div. 1975); Clark v. Pattern Analy-
sis & Recog. Corp., 87 Misc.2d 385, 384 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1976); People v. Concord
Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc.2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd per curiam, 50 App. Div.2d
787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975); see text accompanying notes 36-113 infr..
' 430 U.S. 462 (1977). In Santa Fe, a minority shareholder challenged a public corpora-
tion's attempt to go private by merging with a privately held corporation under the Delaware
short-form merger statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974). 430 U.S. at 465; see note 18
infra. The plaintiff alleged that the merger violated Rule 10b-5 since the merger was neither
preceded by notice to minority shareholders nor designed to promote any corporate purpose.
The Court held that a cause of action on the ground of fraud or fiduciary breach did not lie
under federal securities laws absent deception, misrepresentation or nondisclosure. 430 U.S.
at 476; see 1976-1977 Securities Law Developments-Rule 10-b5, 34 WASH. & LEE L. RaV. 882,
929 (1977); Note, The Second Circuit Review-1975-76 Term-Securities, 43 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 1435, 1475 (1977); Note, The Second Circuit Adopts a Business Purpose Test for Going
Private: Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp. and Greene v. Santa Fe Indus., 64 CALw. L. REV. 1184
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Business Purpose Test]; 89 HARv. L. REV. 1917 (1976). The
Santa Fe liolding clearly indicates that recent federal court decisions applying Rule loi-5 to
freeze out transactions despite full and fair disclosure were unwarranted in light of a congres-
sional intent to let state law govern such actions. 430 U.S. at 477-80; see St. Louis Union Trust
Co., v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040, 1052 (8th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 46 U.S.L.W. 3586 (No. 77-1049, Mar. 21, 1978); Voege v. Magnvox Co., 439 F. Supp.
935, 939-40 (D. Del. 1977). Cases tacitly overruled by Santa Fe for improperly expanding 10b-
5 protection are Merrit v. Libby, McNeil & Libby, 533 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1976)(existence of
corporate purpose shelters merger from 10b-5 attack); Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 533 F.2d
1277 (2d Cir.)(cash out merger lacking corporate purpose subject to claim based on 10b-5),
vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness, 429 U.S. 881 (1976); Albright v. Bergen-
dahl, 391 F. Supp. 754 (D. Utah 1974)(cash out of minority shareholders amounts to scheme
or artifice to defraud under 10b-5); Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 343 F. Supp. 1062 (N.D.
Ga. 1972) (freeze out merger designed solely to eliminate minority shareholder in close corpo-
ration violation of 10b-5), aff'd on other grounds, 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir.)(freeze out held
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other corporate reorganizations aimed at "freezing out"5 minority share-
holders is currently in a state of flux. Santa Fe held that federal securities
laws may not be used to adjudicate claims of unfairness by minority share-
holders when there is no alleged non-disclosure or misrepresentation by
majority shareholders or corporate fiduciaries.' Since Santa Fe clearly held
that aggrieved minority shareholders must resort exclusively to state for-
ums to adjudicate unfairness claims,7 recent state court decisions dealing
with freeze outs merit consideration to determine if adequate relief is being
afforded discontented minority shareholders.
improper under state law), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 844 (1974); Box v. Northrop [1975-1976
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,454 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1976) (merger without
a corporate purpose aimed at freezing out minority shareholders breach of 10b-5). See
generally Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663
(1974)[hereinafter cited as Cary] (advocating expanded federal supervision of corporate
management); Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977)[hereinafter cited as Winter](opposing expanded
federal remedies in securities field).
Cases subsequent to Santa Fe suggest that the mere characterization of acts of majority
shareholders as concealments or misrepresentations does not necessarily bring the alleged
misconduct within the purview of Rule 10b-5. Voege v. Magnavox, 439 F. Supp. 935, 941-42
(D. Del. 1977)(legal opinion in proxy statement regarding authority of corporation to consum-
mate proposed merger even if wrong cannot be deemed a concealment or misrepresentation
under Rule lOb-5 since statement is not manipulative or deceptive). See generally Greene,
supra note 2, at 497 n.37.
- The term "freeze out," as used herein, describes an action by controlling shareholders
resulting in the termination of a stockholder's interest in the enterprise. See Vorenberg, supra
note 2, at 1192. In addition, a freeze out generally connotes a forced "liquidation or sale of
the stockholder's shares, not incident to some other wholesome business goal." Id. at 1192-
93. A freeze out merger may be used to complete the acquisition of a corporation, to take a
corporation private, see note 1 supra, or to eliminate minority shareholders from a close
corporation. Greene, supra note 2, at 518; F. O'NEAL, "SQUEEZE-OuTs" OF MiNoRrrY
SHARoLDEas § 1.01 n.1 (1975)[hereinafter cited as O'NEAL].
1 430 U.S. at 477-79. The court held that judicial extension of Rule 10b-5 was improper,
but noted that there may be a need for uniform federal fiduciary standards to govern short-
form mergers utilized in going private transactions. Id. at 479-80; see Cary, supra note 4, at
696-705. The Securities Exchange Commission recently has proposed a rule expressly de-
signed to assure fairness in going private transactions. Proposed Rule 13e-3, reprinted in
[1977] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 23,703 A, SEC Securities Act Release No. 34-14185 (Nov.
17, 1977). Proposed Rule 13e-3 applies to the purchase of an equity security by the issuer, a
tender offer or request for tenders, and a solicitation of any proxy, consent or authorization
of a holder of equity security by the issuer. The transaction must be in connection with a
merger, consolidation, reclassification, reorganization or similar transaction between an is-
suer and affiliate, sale of substantial corporate assets or reverse stock split. Finally, the
transaction must result in the delisting of a class of equity securities from a national ex-
change, termination of SEC registration of a class of equity securities, or the suspension of
SEC reporting obligations. In addition to prohibiting fraud, deception and manipulation, the
rule provides for rigorous scrutiny of the transaction to assure fairness to shareholders. Con-
siderations bearing on the issue of fairness include the purpose of the transaction, the tax
consequences to shareholders, the consideration offered shareholders, and the approval or
disapproval of the transaction by disinterested directors and a majority of the non-controlling
shareholders. See generally Greene, supra note 2, at 506-08.
7 See note 4 supra.
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Although the elimination of minority shareholders is not a novel corpo-
rate activity,8 freeze outs have become increasingly popular in recent years
as a result of the depressed securities market.' Reduced price earnings
ratios of publicly traded securities and the drop in market prices below
book value have resulted in the desire by insiders to reacquire publicly held
shares at bargain prices." The motives for going private are varied and
controversial, as are the devices used to accomplish the freeze out.1
Corporations going private advance a myriad of reasons to justify their
actions.2 Generally, majority shareholders rationalize going private on the
grounds that share repurchasing creates increased leverage, improved
earrings per share, upward valuation of securities for use in various corpo-
rate transactions, and substantial savings in the cost of SEC registration
and compliance. 3 In addition, the elimination of public shareholders sup-
posedly permits increased corporate flexibility and more prudent manage-
ment resulting from the absence of pressures accompanying public owner-
ship." Insiders also may be motivated, however, by the prospect of enrich-
ing themselves at the expense of the public shareholders. 5 In the case of a
close corporation, controlling shareholders may seek to freeze out minority
shareholders because of conflicts of interest, policy disagreements, deterio-
ration of personal relationships or lack of shareholder cooperation.",
To secure the advantages of going private, majority shareholders seek-
ing to eliminate minority shareholders in their corporation may create a
shell corporation, 7 exchange their shares in the old corporation for those
of the shell corporation, and then merge the two corporations under either
state long or short-form merger statutes. 8 To complete the freeze out, the
I See, e.g., MacCrone v. American Capital Corp., 51 F. Supp. 462 (D. Del. 1943); Raff
v. Darrow, 184 Ind. 353, 111 N.E. 189 (1916); Beloff v. Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y.
11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949); Theis v. Spokane Falls Gaslight Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74P. 1004 (1904).
9 Going Private, supra note 1, at 903; Note, Going Private: Who Shall Provide the
Remedies?, 51 ST. JOHNS L. REv. 131 (1976)[hereinafter cited as Going Private: Remedies].
10 Going Private: Remedies, supra note 9, at 131.
" See text accompanying notes 12-22 infra.
Iz See generally Borden, supra note 2, at 1006-15; Greene, supra note 2, at 495 n.32;
O'NEAL, supra note 5, at §§ 2.01-2.20; Going Private, supra note 1, at 905-09, 922-23.
IS Going Private, supra note 1, at 905.09.
" See O'NEAL, supra note 5, at § 2.11; Business Purpose Test, supra note 4, at 1209.
IS Going Private, supra note 1, at 905-06.
See generally O'NEAL, supra note 5, at §§ 2.02-2.11. Although insiders advance many
reasons for freeze outs, it is questionable whether the motives of controlling shareholders
justify the termination of the minority's investment. See generally Brudney, A Note on
"Going Private," 61 VA. L. REv. 1019, 1026-39 (1975)[hereinafter cited as Brudney]; see text
accompanying notes 23-27 infra.
' See Braasch v. Goldschmidt, 41 Del. Ch. 519, 199 A.2d 760, 762-64 (1964).
, See Borden, supra note 2, at 994-97. Under long-form merger statutes, two or more
corporations may merge upon the adoption of a merger resolution by the boards of directors
of the companies followed by approval by a majority of the shareholders in the merging
companies. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1974); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-5-2 (Bums
1972); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § § 902-03 (McKinney 1963). See generally Balotti, The Elimina-
tion of the Minority Interests by Mergers Pursuant to Section 251 of the General Corporation
Law of Delaware, 1 DEL. J. CORP. LAw 63 (1976)[hereinafter cited as Balotti]. A short-form
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controlling shareholders can adopt a corporate resolution compelling the
cash redemption of the minority's equity interest in the old corporation. 9
If the majority is seeking to acquire an independent corporation, the major-
ity may begin by making a tender offer for shares in the target corpora-
tion."0 Assuming a sufficient number of shares is purchased, a merger is
effected and followed by a cash out or some other means of eliminating
public shareholders of the acquired corporation.21 Finally, if a close corpo-
ration is involved, minority shareholders may be frozen out by a variety of
methods including a merger with a shell corporation, the withholding of
dividends, and/or a sale of assets to majority shareholders or a dissolu-
tion.22
Notwithstanding the fact that the foregoing freeze out techniques are
condoned expressly by state legislatures,2 freeze outs are vulnerable to
merger is accomplished solely by a resolution of the board of directors of a corporation which
owns the requisite percentage of the outstanding shares of the target corporation. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974)(requiring 90% ownership); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 905
(McKinney Cum. Supp. 1977)(requiring 95% ownership). See generally Beloff v. Consoli-
dated Edison Co. of New York, 300 N.Y. 11, 87 N.E.2d 561 (1949); Brudney & Chirelstein,
Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HAMV. L. REv. 297 (1974)[hereinafter
cited as Brudney & Chirelstein]; 32 U. Cta. L. REv. 596 (1965)[hereinafter cited as Chicago
Comment]. Freeze outs also have occurred through dissolution, Borden, supra note 2, at 993
n.27, citing Rossing v. State Bank, 181, Iowa 1013, 165 N.W. 254 (1917), issuance of new stock,
O'NEAL, supra note 5, at § 5.09, and through sale of corporate assets to a new corporation
owned by the old corporation's majority shareholders. See, e.g., Allaun v. Consolidated Oil
Co., 16 Del. Ch. 318, 147 A. 257 (1929). See generally O'NmAL, supra note 5, at §§ 3.01-6.10;
Sprecher, The Right of Minority Stockholders to Prevent Dissolution of a Profitable
Enterprise, 33 Ky. L.J. 150 (1945); Note, Freezing Out Minority Shareholders, 74 HARv. L.
R.v. 1630 (1961)[hereinafter cited as Minority Shareholders].
"' See, e.g., Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962); David J. Greene
& Co. v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30 (Del. Ch. 1971); see Greene, supra note 2, at 491.
In almost all jurisdictions, shareholders facing a forced share redemption pursuant to a
merger have the option of objecting to the offered price and receiving an independent ap-
praisal of the value of their shares. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Cum. Supp. 1977);
see O'NEAL, supra note 5, at § 5.27; text accompanying notes 31-35 infra.
2 A tender offer is a "written offer to purchase within a specified period of time a
quantity of corporate securities for cash or other securities. . . at a stated price or exchange
ratio." Kerr, Going Private: Adopting a Corporate Purpose Standard, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 33, 34
(1975)[hereinafter cited as Kerr]. See generally E. ARAwow & H. EiNHoRN, TENDER OFFERS
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 46-63 (1977); Borden, supra note 2, at 1003-06; Fleischer &
Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 317 (1967); Greene,
supra note 2, at 491; Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and
Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 213 (1977).
21 A freeze out also may be completed by a reverse stock split declared by a resolution of
a corporation's board of directors followed by a forced redemption of fractional shares as
permitted by state statute. See, e.g., Teschner v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 59 Ill.2d 452,
322 N.E.2d 54 (1974), appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002 (1975)(600:1 split); Clark v. Pattern
Analysis & Recog. Corp., 87 Misc.2d 385, 384 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1976)(4000:1 split).
2 See O'NEAL, supra note 5, at §§ 3.04, 5.13-5.14, 5.17, 5.23; text accompanying notes
96-113 infra.
2 See, e.g., N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §§ 901-06 (McKinney 1963)(permitting mergers and
consolidations); cf. Willcox v. Stern, 18 N.Y.2d 195, 201-02, 273 N.Y.S.2d 38, 43 (1966)(noting
legislative policy permitting freeze outs); Tanzer Econ. Assocs., Inc. Profit Sharing Plan v.
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criticism on the ground that they result in unfair displacement of minority
shareholders. The primary objection to freeze out mergers is based on the
strong likelihood that unfairness will result since controlling shareholders
are permitted to set the price at which minority shareholders must redeem
their shares.5 Forced shareholder displacement also denies the minority
the privilege of continued participation in the enterprise26 and may subject
eliminated shareholders to unanticipated tax liability. In light of these
factors, courts traditionally have scrutinized freeze out transactions care-
Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc.2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 477 (Sup. Ct. 1976)(legis-
lative policy clearly permits freeze out of minority pursuant to short-merger statute); Greene,
supra note 2, at 487 (modem merger statutes permit freeze outs without prior minority
consent). Almost all state statutes governing going private transactions do not require a
merging corporation to offer minority shareholders a continued equity interest in the new
corporation nor is proof of any legitimate corporate motive necessary to justify the transac-
tion. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251, 253-58 ( 1974); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 905
(McKinney 1963). But see CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 1101-1101.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1978)(in
merger other than short-form merger, nonredeemable common shares of a constitutent corpo-
ration may not be converted into cash, but must be converted into nonredeemable common
shares of the surviving corporation, unless all shareholders of the class consent or the terms
and conditions of the transaction are approved as fair by certain independent state authori-
ties). Instead, legislatures, through adoption of appraisal statutes, have required only that
frozen out shareholders receive fair value for their shares. See text accompanying notes 31-
35 infra.
24 Among the injustices of a freeze out are the minority's lack of participation in the
decision to freeze out, the possibility that the transaction will be financed with corporate
assets, and the likelihood that the minority's shares will be repurchased below their original
sales prices. Going Private: Remedies, supra note 9, at 133-35. See generally O'NEAL, supra
note 5, at § 1.03; sources at note 2 supra.
Greene, supra note 2, at 490.
26 Id.; Business Purpose Test, supra note 4, at 1202. The denial to the minority of
continued participation in the corporation has been labeled a "pernicious practice which
courts of equity cannot too promptly condemn." Theis v. Spokane Falls Gaslight Co., 34
Wash. 23, 74 P. 1004, 1006 (1904); see Outwater v. Pacific Serv. Corp., 103 N.J. Eq. 461, 143
A. 729, 730 (Ch. Ct. 1928) (continued membership in corporation is inherent property right),
aff'd per curiam, 104 N.J. Eq. 490, 148 A. 916 (Ct. Err. & App. 1929). Ousted minority
shareholders are forced to bear the expense and inconvenience of finding an alternative
investment, are deprived of a potential market for securities, and are denied a share of the
corporation's potential profits. See Brudney, supra note 16, at 1023; Going Private, supra note
1, at 927. Notwithstanding shareholders' expectations of continued participation, Gabhart v.
Gabhart, 370 N.E.2d 345, 355 (Ind. 1977); Brudney, supra note 16, at 1052, most courts have
held that a shareholder has no right to an equity interest in the corporation resulting from a
merger. See, e.g., Krafcisin v. LaSalle Madison Hotel Co. [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 93,586 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 154
A.2d 893, 897 (Del. 1959), discussed in Note, Elimination of Minority Share Interests by
Merger: A Dissent, 54 Nw. L. Rxv. 629 (1959); David J. Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus.,
Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971); Norton v. Union Traction Co., 183 Ind. 666, 110 N.E.
113, 119 (1915). Although early state statutes contemplated that shareholders would receive
an equity interest in the surviving corporation, modern statutes provide shareholders with
an appraisal remedy subsequent to a merger or consolidation in lieu of an equity interest in
the surviving corporation. See Voege v. American Sumatra Tobacco Corp., 241 F. Supp. 369,
374 (D. Del. 1965); O'NEAL, supra note 5, at § 5.03.
7 Greene, supra note 2, at 490.
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fully" and have imposed a fiduciary duty on majority shareholders to
insure that controlling parties are not unjustly enriched at the expense of
displaced shareholders."
Historically, minority shareholders were protected from the majority by
means of their common law veto right." In the last century, however, state
legislatures almost unanimously have adopted an appraisal remedy as a
means of promoting economic fairness in corporate reorganizations.31 The
appraisal remedy is triggered by certain statutorily designated transac-
tions and provides a dissenting shareholder the right to have his shares
2 Arms length agreements between independent corporations are presumptively fair,
Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 608-09 (Del. Ch.), affrd, 316 A.2d 619 (1974), and are
evaluated in accordance with the business judgment doctrine which requires objecting share-
holders to prove conscious abuse of discretion, gross unfairness or bad faith. Getty Oil Co. v.
Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (Del. 1970); Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904,
908 (Del. Ch. 1973); see 3A W. FrcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAw OF PRmVATE CORPORATONS §
1039 (rev. perm. ed. 1975); O'NFAL, supra note 5, at § 3.03. If controlling shareholders stand
on both sides of the transaction, however, as is the case in most going private transactions,
Note, Going Private: An Analysis of Federal and State Remedies, 44 FoRDHAM L. REv. 796,
812 (1976)[hereinafter cited as Federal and State Remedies], self-dealing is present and the
burden of proving the fairness of the transaction shifts to the controlling parties. Geddes v.
Anaconda Copper Min. Co., 254 U.S. 590, 599 (1921); Sinclair Oil Co. v. Levien, 280 A.2d
717, 720 (Del. 1971); see, e.g., Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 109-10 (Del.
1952); Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 132 N.J. Super. 35, 342 A.2d 566, 574 (Ch. Div. 1975);
Chelrob, Inc. v. Barrett, 293 N.Y. 442, 461, 57 N.E.2d 825, 834 (1944), aff'd, 270 App. Div.
825, 60 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1946).
Majority shareholders are bound by a fiduciary duty preventing the exercise of corpo-
rate power in a manner inconsistent with the interests of minority shareholders. Going Pri-
vate, supra note 1, at 914; see, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939)(controlling
stockholder is fiduciary and his dealings with the corporation are subject to rigid scrutiny);
Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487-88 (1919)(majority's fiduciary duty prohibits
the minority's exclusion from fair participation in the fruits of a sale of corporate assets);
Lebold v. Inland S.S. Co., 82 F.2d 351, 354 (7th Cir. 1936)(majority may not take unfair
advantage of minority); Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal.3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 471, 81
Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969)(majority shareholders may not use power to benefit themselves alone
or in any manner detrimental to minority), discussed in Note, Jones v. Ahmanson: The
Fiduciary Obligations of Majority Shareholders, 70 CoLum. L. Rav. 1079 (1970). See generally
Going Private, supra, note 1, at 913-16.
3 At common law, no fundamental corporate change could occur without unanimous
shareholder consent. Voeller v. Neilston Warehouse Co., 311 U.S. 531, 535 n.6 (1941). The
veto right was based on the premise that a shareholder should not be compelled to participate
in a new or altered enterprise against his will. Greene, supra note 2, at 487 n.1; see O'NAL,
supra note 5, at § 5.27.
31 Vorenberg, supra note 2, at 1189; see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Cum. Supp.
1977). Appraisal statutes enable a shareholder who objects to certain fundamental corporate
transactions to force the corporation to purchase the shareholder's stock at its appraised
value. In addition to permitting a dissenting shareholder to receive fair value for his invest-
ment rather than to accept membership in the new enterprise, the appraisal statutes permit
a shareholder who objects to the price offered by the corporation for his shares in conjunction
with a merger or consolidation to obtain an independent valuation of his investment. See
generally O'NAL, supra note 5, at §§ 5.27-5.28; Vorenberg, supra note 2, passim. Tradition-
ally, courts regarded an appraisal as the dissenting shareholder's exclusive remedy absent




valued and purchased by the corporation.32 Unfortunately, an appraisal
may not result in an adequate substitute for the dissenting shareholder's
investment since the economic value of the shareholder's interest is diffi-
cult to measure.? Moreover, resort to an appraisal deprives the shareholder
of his right to manage the corporation, hinders the shareholder's invest-
ment goals, and denies the shareholder an interest in the increased value
or profit making capability of the corporation resulting from the reorgani-
zation."' Finally, it is questionable whether an appraisal is a proper remedy
when the freeze out has not been designed to promote any legitimate
corporate purpose." In light of the inadequacies of the appraisal remedy
and'the Supreme Court's refusal to apply Rule 10b-5 to fairness claims,
state courts recently have become more sympathetic to the interests of
minority shareholders.
Perhaps the most noteworthy development in regard to minority share-
holder rights is a recent Delaware case, Singer v. Magnavox Co.,3 which
held that a long-form merger" may not be accomplished solely for the
purpose of eliminating minority shareholders.3 Singer is especially signifi-
cant given Delaware's primacy in the area of corporate law 9 and the tradi-
tional reluctance of courts applying Delaware law to inquire into corporate
motives in supervising mergers." Arguably, however, Singer is a dubious
12 O'NmL, supra note 5, at §§ 5.27-5.28. The right of appraisal arises in most states
whenever a corporation merges or consolidates. Some states also permit an appraisal when
certain charter amendments are effected. Id.
m Minority Shareholders, supra note 18, at 1634-35. The problems of corporate valuation
are especially apparent when the values used to measure a shareholder's interest, such as
asset value, market value, earnings value, and dividend value, are speculative. Greene, supra
note 2, at 504; see O'NFAL, supra note 5, at § 2.16; Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock Under
Appraisal Statutes, 79 HAIv. L. Rav. 1453 (1966). Furthermore, the appraisal remedy is
complex and subjects the dissenting shareholder to delay and possible litigation expense.
Greene, supra note 2, at 504. See generally 15 W. FLETcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PIVATE
CORPORATIONS §§ 7165 & 7165.1 (rev. perm. ed. 1973); Brudney, supra note 16, at 1023-25;
Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223
(1962); Vorenberg, supra note 2, at 1200-05.
31 See Jutkowitz v. Bourns, No. CA 000268 (Cal. Super. Ct., filed Nov. 19, 1975); see note
123 infra. See generally sources at note 33 supra.
11 Appraisal and merger statutes are silent on the issue of corporate purpose and motive,
but many recent decisions reviewing corporate reorganizations have examined the purpose
of the transactions to determine if the freeze out of the minority shareholders is justifiable.
See text accompanying notes 36-113 infra.
380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
See note 18 supra. The Delaware long-form merger statute, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
251 (1974 and Cum. Supp. 1977), requires that the merger agreement state the terms and
conditions of the merger and the manner in which shares of the corporations will be redeemed.
Cash redemption is expressly permitted. Id. at § 251(b).
3 380 A.2d at 980.
n" Cf. Cary, supra note 4, at 668 (recognizing Delaware's liberal and popular approach
to corporate law).
10 Historically, Delaware courts have not enjoined mergers absent fraud, illegality or
gross abuse of discretion by majority shareholders. See MacCrone v. American Capital Corp.,
51 F. Supp. 462, 466 (D. Del. 1943)(reasons for merger or business necessity not matters for
judicial determination); Federal United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331, 337 (Del.
19781
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victory for opponents of freeze out mergers since the test established to
govern such transactions may be satisfied with little difficulty.41
Singer involved an attempt by North American Phillips Corporation
(North American) to acquire an independent, unaffiliated corporation,
The Magnavox Company (Magnavox), and to eliminate Magnavox's pub-
lic shareholders." To accomplish the merger, North American created a
subsidiary, North American Development Corporation (Development) for
the purpose of making a tender offer for the publicly held Magnavox
shares.43 Following the purchase of eighty-four percent of the outstanding
Magnavox shares, Development created a subsidiary, T.M.C. Develop-
ment Corporation (T.M.C.) to consummate the acquisition." Magnavox
then was merged into T.M.C. pursuant to Delaware's long-form merger
statute and the remaining Magnavox shareholders were offered cash for
their stock. 5 After the merger, the minority shareholders in Magnavox
chose not to resort to an appraisal remedy, but brought suit in the Court
of Chancery alleging that the merger was fraudulent in that it was devoid
of corporate purpose, that the cash redemption price was inadequate, and
that the merger violated the Delaware Securities Act."
The Court of Chancery dimissed the minority shareholders' complaint
on the ground that Delaware law did not require a corporation complying
with the express language of the long-form merger statute to show any
independent corporate purpose for a merger.47 On appeal, the Delaware
1940) (power to merge not qualified by any limitation or exception). Until recently, New York
courts also have indicated a reluctance to inquire into corporate motives for a merger. See
note 43 infra.
" See text accompanying note 72 infra.
42 380 A.2d at 971.
3 Development offered to purchase Magnavox stock at eight dollars per share. Id. The
tender offer statement included an explanation of the effects of an acquisition of Magnavox
shares and alternative methods of establishing control in the event that the tender offer failed.
" Id. at 971-72. Initially, the Magnavox board of directors opposed the tender offer as
inadequate given Magnavox's book value of eleven dollars per share. Pursuant to an agree-
ment between North American, Development, and Magnavox, the offer price was increased
to nine dollars per share, contracts of employment were offered to various Magnavox officers,
and Magnavox's opposition to the tender offer was withdrawn. See text accompanying notes
17-21 supra.
0 Id. at 972; see note 37 supra.
" 380 A.2d at 972. The minority stockholders were offered the merger price of nine dollars
per share and were advised of their statutory appraisal rights under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
262 (1974), current version at DzL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (Cum. Supp. 1977); see text
accompanying notes 31-34 supra.
41 Singer v. Magnovox [sic] Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1356-58 (Del. Ch. 1976). The Court of
Chancery did not depart from the traditional Delaware approach despite the existence of two
recent unreported Court of Chancery opinions which made references to a business purpose
test. See Pennsylvania Mut. Fund, Inc. v. Todhunter Int'l, Inc., No. 4845 (Del. Ch. filed Aug.
5, 1975) (questioning whether a long-form merger can be consummated without a business
purpose); Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., No. 4945 (Del. Ch. filed Dec. 23,
1975) (upholding a merger after noting that the parent corporation had a compelling business
reason to merge with a subsidiary), aff'd, 379 A.2d 1121 (1977); see text accompanying notes
63-71 infra. The Court of Chancery also held that the complaint failed to state a cause of
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Supreme Court reversed holding that a long-form merger accomplished
solely for the purpose of eliminating minority shareholders was void in that
it constituted a breach of the majority shareholder's fiduciary obligation
to deal fairly with the minority." Although no previous Delaware Supreme
Court decision had embraced such a broad notion of the majority's duty
of fair dealing,"9 the Singer court relied heavily on earlier cases which
recognized in general terms the fiduciary obligations of parties controlling
corporate reorganizations." Despite the court's reliance on the established
Delaware fiduciary doctrine, Singer is clearly unprecedented in view of the
fact that earlier Delaware decisions, have upheld transactions substan-
tially similar to the Singer merger. 1
action under the Delaware Securities Act and that an appraisal was the appropriate remedy
for alleged price inadequacy. Singer v. Magnovox [sic] Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1361-62 (Del. Ch.
1976).
" 380 A.2d at 980. The court affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim based on the
Delaware Securities Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 7303 (1974), on the ground that the Act
did not apply to the Singer transaction since contracts and sales of securities which take place
outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the state are not within the purview of the Act. 380
A.2d at 981-82.
" Delaware courts previously have scrutinized carefully mergers in which a dominant
party stands on both sides of a merger, and have required the controlling party to demonstrate
the fairness of the transaction. See, e.g., Bastian v. Bourns, Inc., 256 A.2d 680, 681 (Del. Ch.
1969), aff'd, 278 A.2d 467 (1970); David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427,
430-31 (Del. Ch. 1968). The Delaware Supreme Court, however, previously had not held a
merger designed to eliminate minority shareholders invalid per se. Courts in other jurisdic-
tions have required majority shareholders to demonstrate some business reason for freezing
out a minority shareholder. See, e.g., Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 570-71 (5th
Cir. 1974)(applying Georgia law to bar freeze out of minority shareholder in close corpora-
tion), noted at Kessler, Elimination of Minority Interests by Cash Merger: Two Recent Cases,
30 Bus. LAw. 699 (1975); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 664
(Mass. 1976)(barring freeze out of minority shareholder without a legitimate business purpose
in close corporation); Tanzer Econ. Assocs. v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc.2d
167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 479 (Sup. Ct. 1976)(see text accompanying notes 85-93 infra); Matte-
son v. Ziebarth, 40 Wash.2d 286, 242 P.2d 1025, 1031 (1952) (upholding merger upon demon-
stration of lawful business purpose).
0 380 A.2d at 976-80. The court began its analysis by acknowledging the Delaware rule
that statutory compliance does not bar review of a transaction by a court of equity. Id. at
975; see Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 437 (Del. 1971)(involving advancement
of the date of an annual meeting accomplished in compliance with relevant statute); Bennett
v. Breuil Petro. Corp., 99 A.2d 236, 239 (Del. 1953)(stock issuance with requisite statutory
vote not immune from judicial scrutiny of allegations of bad faith, improper motive, and gross
price inadequacy). Numerous Delaware cases have imposed a fiduciary obligation on majority
shareholders in their dealings with minority shareholders. See, e.g., Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107 (Del. 1952); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939); David J.
Green & Co., v. Dunhill Int'l, Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968); Allied Chem. & Dye Corp.
v. Steel & Tube Co. of America, 14 Del. Ch. 1, 120 A. 486, preliminary injunction denied, 14
Del. Ch. 64, 122 A. 142 (1923), dismissed, 124 A. 414 (1925). Under the fiduciary duty rule,
emphasis traditionally has been placed on the fairness of the price offered shareholders and
not on the purpose of the merger. See, e.g., Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 187 A.2d 78,
80 (Del. 1962)(only issue in short-form merger, absent fraud, is value); Sterling v. Mayflower
Hotel Corp., 93 A.2d 107, 113-14 (Del. 1952)(test of fairness is that minority shareholder
receive substantial equivalent of prior value).
51 The Singer court concluded that Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 187 A.2d 78 (Del.
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In arriving at its holding, the Singer court did not endorse expressly the
approach of recent cases which require merging corporations to demon-
strate a legitimate business reason for eliminating minority shareholders.2
The court chose instead to balance the interests of the parties to the trans-
action." Since the defendants in Singer conceded that the merger was
designed exclusively to freeze out the minority shareholders,5" the court
focused on whether the statutory power to consummate a merger provided
the majority the right to merge the corporation at the minority's expense."
In determining whether the minority was afforded proper treatment, the
court began by taking notice of the fact that an appraisal remedy does not
necessarily assure a shareholder an adequate substitute for his investment
in terms of form and value." In conjunction with this premise, the court
1962), was not authority justifying the Singer merger since Stauffer did not involve a straight
cash out merger. 380 A.2d 978-79. In Stauffer, the controlling corporation created a subsidiary
which was merged with the minority shareholders' corporation through a share-for-share
exchange. Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 187 A.2d 78, 79 (Del. 1962). Thereafter, the
subsidiary was merged into the controlling corporation and the minority was cashed out. The
Singer court attempted to distinguish Stauffer on the ground that the dispute in Stauffer was
over the value of the minority shareholder's investment and not over the purpose of the
transaction. Although the specific issues litigated were not identical in the two cases, this
should not obscure the fact that the underlying transactions in Singer and Stauffer were the
same. In both cases, minority shareholders were forced to accept cash for common stock and
in both the merging corporation advanced no purpose for the merger. Indeed, Stauffer is
generally recognized as express authority for a cash freeze out of minority shareholders. See
O'NnAL, supra note 5, at § 5.14. Similarly, in Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 154
A.2d 893 (Del. 1959), the court noted that under the short-form merger statute minority
shareholders could be cashed out. Id. at 897; see Balotti, supra note 18, at 68-69. The Singer
court noted, however, that to the extent earlier merger cases are inconsistent with Singer they
are overruled.
52 380 A.2d 975-76. As the court recognized, the business purpose approach, although
growing in popularity, see note 49 supra, is not an ideal solution to freeze out problems since
courts have not established a clear standard for determining the types of mergers to which
such an approach should apply, whose purpose must be satisfied, and what purposes justify
a freeze out. Greene, supra note 2, at 499-502; see text accompanying notes 115 infra.
380 A.2d at 976.
Singer v. Magnovox [sic] Co., 367 A.2d 1349, 1353 (Del. Ch. 1976).
" 380 A.2d at 976-80.
"- Id. at 977-78. The court stated categorically that an appraisal remedy is not a dissent-
ing shareholder's exclusive remedy if he is dissatisfied with a merger. In addition to appraisal
rights, the court noted that a shareholder has the right to enjoin a cash out merger designed
for the sole purpose of eliminating the shareholder's equity interest. Id. at 977-80. The court
did not go so far as to recognize a right of continued equity participation in the merged
corporation. Other courts have granted minority shareholders the right to enjoin any merger
which does not promote a corporate purpose. See note 83 infra. In California, common share-
holders are afforded by statute the right of continued equity participation subsequent to a
merger other than a short-form merger. See note 23 supra. Finally, commentators have
advocated granting cashed out minority shareholders the right to a share of the increased
value of a corporation following a merger. See Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 18; text
accompanying notes 119-23 infra.
In the past, Delaware courts have not regarded an appraisal as a bar to judicial review
of the substantive fairness of a transaction. See generally Vorenberg, supra note 2, at 1205-
17. When an appraisal is available, however, the chances of enjoining a merger under Dela-
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reiterated the Delaware fiduciary doctrine that the corporate majority may
not direct activities in a manner detrimental to the minority." On the basis
of these propositions, the court concluded that it was a fortiori a breach of
fiduciary duty to transact a cash out merger absent some reason other than
a desire simply to eliminate minority shareholders."
Singer marks a departure from the traditional Delaware approach to
mergers in that it broadens the scope of the majority's fiduciary duty. 9 The
opinion is substantially deficient, however, in that it promulgates no dis-
cernible guidelines for determining what constitutes sufficient justification
for a freeze out." Arguably, Singer will afford little solace to discontented
minority shareholders61 in light of a more recent Delaware Supreme Court
decision, Tanzer v. International General Industries, Inc."2 In Tanzer, mi-
nority shareholders of a subsidiary corporation sought to enjoin a long-form
merger of the subsidiary into its parent corporation. 3 Plaintiffs contended
that a cash freeze out designed solely for the benefit of the parent corpora-
tion violated the parent's fiduciary duty as a majority shareholder." Ii
ware law have been slim. See Stauffer v. Standard Brands, Inc., 187 A.2d 78, 80 (Del.
1962)(very purpose of short-form merger statute is to permit elimination of minority share-
holders); David J. Greene v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971)(rights of
minority under long-form merger statute, no greater than under short-form statute; absent
fraud and over-reaching, appraisal is only remedy); Balotti, supra note 18, at 66-73; Going
Private, supra note 1, at 920 (most recent Delaware cases suggest courts prefer that-minorities
settle for an appraisal in nearly every situation).
'7 380 A.2d at 976-77.
Id. at 980. Although the court restricted its holding by stating that the majority's
fiduciary obligation prevents a merger designed solely to freeze out the minority, Singer
makes ambiguous references to a business purpose requirement. Id. at 975 & 980; see text
accompanying notes 59-69 infra.
" Cf. Kemp v. Angel, 381 A.2d 241, 245 (Del. Ch. 1977) (noting broad reach of Singer in
terms of majority's fiduciary duty to minority shareholders); see text accompanying notes 49-
50 supra.
380 A.2d at 976-80. Singer did refer broadly to the importance of demonstrating a
business purpose, but did not indicate whether the purpose must be that of the majority
shareholders or of the corporation. Small, The Function of Directors in Acquisition of Con-
trolled Corporations, in PLI NINTH ANNUAL INSTITuTE ON SEcunrrmEs REGULATION 47, 52-53
(Mundheim, Fleischer & Vandegrift eds. 1978) [hereinafter cited as Small]; see text accom-
panying notes 65-69 infra.
11 The dissenting shareholders in Singer also failed in their attempt to invalidate the
merger in federal court on the basis of claims under Rules 10b-5 and 14a-9 that the proxy
statement issued prior to the merger contained material misrepresentations and conceal-
ments and was erroneous as to the legality and effect of the merger. Voege v. Magnavox Co.,
439 F. Supp. 935, 940-41 (D. Del. 1977).
2 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977). The Singer opinion was edited after Tanzer in order to
remove language expressly adopting a business purpose test. Small, supra note 60, at 52.
" 379 A.2d at 1122. Plaintiffs, shareholders in Kliklok Corporation (Kliklok), named as
defendants International Industries, Inc. (International), which owned eighty-one percent of
the shares of Kliklok, and International's directors. International had created KLK Corpora-
tion for the purpose of transacting a long-form merger with Kliklok. Thereafter, the boards
of directors of the three corporations and the requisite shareholders of each corporation
approved the merger plan and the plaintiff shareholders sought an injunction. Id.
" Id. Various policy arguments favor parent-subsidiary mergers. Consolidation of parent
and subsidiary engaged in similar operations often results in elimination of conflicts of inter-
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examining the merger the court focused, as in Singer, not on the business
purposes of the merging corporations, but on the interests of the majority
and minority shareholders. 5 In balancing the interests of the parties, the
Tanzer court recognized the established Delaware rule that shareholders
are entitled to exercise voting rights in accordance with their own self-
interests,6 subject only to the duty owed other shareholders." Conse-
quently, the court reasoned that majority shareholders may vote to elimi-
nate minority shareholders provided the transaction promotes a bona fide
purpose of the majority. 8 The Tanzer court found that a bona fide majority
purpose was demonstrated since the merger was accomplished to facilitate
long term debt financing by the parent corporation. Therefore, the Singer
rule was not breached since the merger was not designed solely to freeze
out the minority. 0 The court remanded the case, however, with directions
that the trial court scrutinize the transaction not only in terms of the
est, economies of combined operation, greater managerial efficiency, and tax savings through
the filing of consolidated tax returns. See Borden, supra note 2, at 1018. These reasons also
support a merger whenever the merging corporations are engaged in similar business pursuits.
See Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393, 1402 (N.D. Fla. 1974).
The same reasons do not apply, however, to a freeze out in a close corporation or a pure going
private transaction when there is no consolidation of management or operational facilities
between two distinct corporate entities. See Borden, supra note 2, at 1018-20; Greene, supra
note 2, at 491-96, 508-13; Vorenberg, supra note 2, at 1198-99. See generally Chirelstein,
Sargeant & Lipton, "Fairness" in Mergers Between Parents and Partly Owned Subsidiaries
in PLI EIGHT ANNUAL INsTITuTE ON SzcumnTs REGULATION 273 (Mundheim, Fleischer & Van-
degrift eds. 1977)[hereinafter cited as Chirelstein, Sargeant & Lipton].
0 379 A.2d at 1123.
0 Id. at 1123-24, citing Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Com. Shows v. Ringling, 53 A.2d
441, 447 (1947)(shareholder may exercise wide liberality of judgment and motive in voting
subject to this duty to fellow shareholders); Heil v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 17 Del. Ch.
214, 151 A. 303, 304 (1930)(shareholder may admit personal profit, whims, and caprice as
voting motives as long as no advantage is gained at expense of fellow shareholders); W.
FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 2031 (rev. perm. ed. 1973).
67 379 A.2d at 1123. Majority shareholders may not vote so as to obtain an advantage at
the expense of fellow shareholders. Id.
0 Id. at 1124. Generally, courts applying some type of "valid purpose test" have stated
that the purpose advanced be that of the corporation and not merely that of the majority
shareholders. See generally Bryan v. Brock & Blevins Co., 490 F.2d 563, 570 (5th Cir.
1974)(applying Georgia law); Gabhart v. Gabhart, 370 N.E.2d 345, 356 (Ind. 1977)(merger
must be for corporate purposes not merely for the benefit of selected shareholders); Kavan-
augh v. Kavanaugh, 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919)(see note 93 infra); Going Private,
supra note 1, at 922-24. Since majority shareholders may have valid reasons to effectuate a
merger which are not necessarily corporate purposes, the majority purpose test of Tanzer is
more permissive than the business purpose test. Nevertheless, since majority shareholders in
corporate reorganizations are usually corporations, courts applying the Tanzer rule should
require that corporate purposes be advanced. Tanzer does, however, avoid much of the ambi-
guity of the business purpose test with respect to which corporation's business must be
promoted by a merger by declaring that the purpose advanced by a merger be that of the
majority shareholder. Furthermore, Tanzer has not sanctioned unrestrained majority voting
discretion since the court recognized that the majority's rights are subject to the fiduciary
duty doctrine.




fairness of the price offered the minority, but also in terms of the "entire
fairness" of all aspects of the transaction as required by Singer.71
Tanzer reveals the narrow scope of Singer since Tanzer suggests that
any alleged benefit to majority shareholders short of a naked desire to
eliminate minority shareholders might satisfy the majority's fiduciary
duty.72 Notwithstanding the conservative application of the Singer rule by
the Tanzer court, the Delaware Court of Chancery in Kemp v. Angel73 has
interpreted those two supreme court cases as substantially broadening the
fiduciary obligations of majority shareholders. In Kemp, minority share-
holders of Aid, Inc. (Aid), a corporation engaged in the ownership and
operation of health care facilities, sought to enjoin the merger of Aid into
Ina Capital Corporation (Capital), a wholly owned subsidiary of Ina Corpo-
ration (Ina) .7' Ina, a broad based financial services company, initiated a
short-form cash out merger75 for the alleged purpose of obtaining tax bene-
fits through the filing of consolidated tax returns, eliminating managerial
overlap among various health care operations under Ina's control, and
avoiding potential conflicts of interest involving the right to acquire partic-
ular hospital facilities." The Kemp court did not dispute the majority's
assertion that the minority shareholders were offered generous value for
their shares.7 The court reasoned, however, that the Singer rule requiring
judicial inquiry into the purpose of a long-form merger, applied equally to
short-form mergers.78 Thus, the court on the basis of Singer did not follow
71 Id. at 1125. In remanding the case, the court noted that the test required by Singer is
based on the "entire fairness" rule of Sterling v. Mayflower Hotel, Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 293, 93
A.2d 107, 109-10 (1952). The Sterling rule embodies the general fiduciary principle that
shareholders controlling a merger must exercise utmost good faith, honesty, and loyalty to
ensure that no advantage is obtained at the minority's expense. Since the fairness rule
traditionally required only that majority shareholders provide the minority shareholders fair
value, see note 50 supra, the only change in the "entire fairness" rule effected by Singer is
the requirement that majority shareholders demonstrate that the merger was not designed
solely to oust minority shareholders.
71 379 A.2d at 1124; see Small, supra note 60, at 53.
381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977).
T, Id. Plaintiffs, in a derivative action, alleged that the merger was fraudulent in that it
was designed for the sole purpose of eliminating minority shareholders at a grossly inadequate
price. Id. Plaintiffs also contended that the controlling -parties falsely represented to Aid
shareholders the purposes of the acquisition and merger and concealed the fact that Aid was
financially strong. Id. at 242.
U' Id. at 241-42. International began acquiring Aid common voting stock in 1969. After
obtaining fifty-six percent of Aid's stock through open market purchases, International in-
creased its ownership to eighty-five percent by means of a tender offer. Finally, International
succeeded in obtaining a ninety percent interest in Aid voting common stock by converting
its holdings of non-voting Aid shares into voting common stock. Id.
11 Id. at 243. Defendants claimed that the economic desirability of the merger arose from
the fact that International recently had acquired a hospital chain comparable to Aid. More-
over, International was in a position to deny Aid future corporate opportunities because of
International's control over independent health care facilities. Id.
SId.
7' Id. at 244. Previous Delaware decisions have established the principle that the rights
of a dissenting shareholder are the same under the short-form merger statute as under the
long-form merger statute. See note 56 supra.
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previous Delaware cases which have held value to be the primary issue
under the short-form merger statute." Instead, the Chancellor enjoined the
merger pending a trial on the merits in order that the "entire fairness" of
the merger could be evaluated."0 Although Kemp contains no definitive
statement as to what majority purposes justify a freeze out, the issuance
of the injunction is particularly significant since other courts have found
a legitimate merger purpose under similar circumstances., More impor-
tantly, Kemp indicates that Singer and Tanzer require Delaware courts to
review more rigorously than in the past the fairness of freeze out mergers
and impose more stringent fiduciary obligations on majority sharehold-
ers .
2
In addition to the recent Delaware cases, decisions in other states ac-
knowledge the need to scrutinize more carefully freeze out transactions."
In New York, for instance, the judiciary is broadening the scope of the
majority shareholder's fiduciary responsibilities.' In Tanzer Economic
' 381 A.2d at 243-44; see note 51 supra.
" 381 A.2d at 245. As in Tanzer, see note 71 supra, the court did not specifically interpret
the "entire fairness" requirement. At a minimum, however, Kemp confirms the Singer rule
that minority shareholders objecting to a merger are not relegated to statutory appraisal
rights. See Small, supra note 60, at 53.
11 See, e.g., Grimes v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, Inc., 392 F. Supp. 1393, 1402 (N.D.
Fla. 1974)(valid business purpose exists for merger between companies engaged in similar
businesses if potential conflict of interest claims by minority shareholders are avoided, and
there exist ascertainable operational savings); Tanzer Econ. Assoc., Inc. v. Universal Food
Specialists, Inc., 87 Misc. 2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976)(see text accompanying
notes 85-93 infra); Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc.2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957, 962 (Sup. Ct.
1976)(noting business purposes of combining management and resources of companies en-
gaged in related businesses and of achieving tax savings); Business Purpose Test, supra note
5, at 1210-11; see note 64 supra.
" 381 A.2d at 245.
83 See, e.g., Jutkowitz v. Bourns, No. CA 000268 (Cal. Super. Ct., Nov. 19, 1975)(recog-
nizing minority's right to continued participation in corporation); Jones v. H. F. Ahmanson
& Co., 1 Cal.3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (Sup. Ct. 1969); Teschner v. Chicago Title
& Trust Co., 59 Ill.2d 452, 322 N.E.2d 54, 58 (1974), appeal dismissed, 422 U.S. 1002
(1975)(implying corporate purpose requirement for reverse stock split resulting in elimination
of minority shareholder); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 662-63
(Mass. 1976)(in closed corporation, majority afforded large measure of discretion in setting
corporate policy; nevertheless, the majority must demonstrate a legitimate business purpose
in order to remove minority shareholder); Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 135 N.J. Super.
36, 342 A.2d 566, 573-74 (1975)(though failing to adopt expressly a business purpose test,
court applied rigorous fairness standards to going private transaction and reasoned that mere
fairness of price is dubious indication of fairness of merger), noted at 49 TEMP. L.Q. 444
(1976). See generally Going Private: Remedies, supra note 9, at 143; see also Zidell v.
Zidell, Inc., 277 Ore. 413, 560 P.2d 1086, 1089 (1977) (majority shareholders' duty to minority
in close corporation satisfied with respect to dividend policy if policy is made in good faith
and reflects legitimate business purpose rather than private interests of controlling parties.
9 See People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc.2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct.), aff'd
per curiam, 50 A.D.2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84 (1975). Concord held that the New York Blue
Sky statute, strikingly similar to federal Rule l0b-5, see Federal and State Remedies, supra
note 28, at 808-09, barred a going private merger. The court reasoned that the elimination of
minority shareholders without a real corporate purpose and with use of corporate funds was
a breach of the insiders' fiduciary duty. Therefore, the merger was deemed a scheme or
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Associates, Inc. v. Universal Food Specialties, Inc.,15 a corporation owning
a majority of the shares of an independent corporation engaged in similar
business activities, proposed a short-form merger to complete its acquisi-
tion of the target corporation." Although the acquiring corporation strictly
complied with statutory merger requirements," the court examined the
transaction to determine whether there was fraud, breach of the majority's
fiduciary obligation, or lack of business purpose.m An analysis of the facts
surrounding the merger revealed that the merger was not a typical one-step
going private transaction,89 but the culmination of a well planned acquisi-
tion of an unaffiliated corporation for the purpose of promoting the syner-
gistic savings and advantages of combined operations. In addition to
finding valid business justifications for the merger, 1 the court reasoned
that throughout the take-over the acquiring corporation afforded frequent
financial assistance to the target corporation and was not promoting a
sham transaction for the purposes of unjustly enriching itself at the ex-
pense of the merged corporation.2 Consequently, the merger was upheld. 3
artifice to defraud minority shareholders despite full disclosure by the majority. 371 N.Y.S.2d
at 554. Concord resulted in a novel interpretation of the Blue Sky statute since the statutory
language clearly requires deception, misrepresentation, or concealment. People v. Concord
Fabrics, Inc., 50 A.D.2d 787, 377 N.Y.S.2d 84, 86 (1975)(Lane, J., dissenting); Federal and
State Remedies, supra note 28, at 809-10. Moreover, the broad interpretation of the statute
was unnecessary in view of the ready applicability of the long-established fiduciary doctrine.
44 FoRDHAM L. REv. 796, 816 (1976). See also Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc.2d 292, 380
N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
87 Misc.2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
" Between 1960 and 1975 Nestle Alimentana S.A. (Nestle), a publicly held Swiss corpo-
ration, and its affiliates including a Delaware subsidiary, Universal Food Specialties (U.F.S.),
acquired approximately ninety-two percent of the outstanding common stock of Libby,
McNeil & Libby (Libby), a Maine corporation, by means of open market purchases and a
tender offer. Id. at 169, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 474-75. Both Nestle and Libby were in the food
processing business. The board of directors of Libby and U.F.S. approved a cash out merger
between Libby and U.F.S. pursuant to short-form merger statutes of Maine, ME. REv. STAT.
tit. 13-A, § 904 (1974), and Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (1974). Plaintiff, a minority
shareholder in Libby, sought monetary damages on the ground of inadequate exchange price
and an injunction against the merger on the grounds that the merger was "unjust, fraudulent,
a breach of defendants' fiduciary obligations, and without proper business purpose." 87
Misc.2d at 171, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
87 Misc.2d at 171, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 476.
Id. at 175, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 479. The court was particularly sensitive to the dangers of
going private and the possibility of overreaching on the part of the majority. Id. at 172-75,
383 N.Y.S.2d at 477-79.
0 Id. at 177, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 480. Tanzer Economic Associates did not involve an at-
tempt by insiders to repurchase at a low price shares sold earlier to the public at higher prices.
Id.
, The merger promised to provide substantial increases in the efficiency and profitabil-
ity of Libby. These gains would result from improved management and planning, economies
resulting from centralized procurement of raw materials, greater diversity of products, and
decreased reliance on outside financing. Id. at 180-82, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 482-83.
" See note 90 supra.
87 Misc.2d at 176-82, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 480-84. Nestle, as the principal stockholder in
Libby, had provided needed capital to Libby at times when bank loans were unavailable.
Furthermore, the merger was funded in such a manner as to assure the financial strength and
942 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
Although a business purpose was clearly articulated in Tanzer Eco-
nomic Associates,94 a later New York case, Clark v. Pattern Analysis &
Recognition Corp.,"5 suggests that the business purpose test may not al-
ways easily be satisfied in freeze out transactions. In Clark, the majority
shareholders of a corporation attempted to freeze out certain minority
shareholders in the corporation by means of a reverse stock split followed
by cash redemption of the minority shareholders' fractional shares." The
proposed recapitalization was not justified by the potential for enhanced
operating economies. Furthermore, the majority did not contend that the
minority hindered corporate activity or stifled managerial efficiency. The
integrity of the U.F.S.-Libby merged corporation. Id. Finally, the court found no evidence of
fraud in terms of the defendants' offer for the plaintiff's stock. Id. at 177-79, 383 N.Y.S.2d at
480-81.
11 Id. at 184, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 484. In upholding the merger the court noted compliance
by the controlling parties with the fiduciary duty rule of Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 226 N.Y.
185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919). 87 Misc.2d at 176-84, 383 N.Y.S.2d at 479-84. In Kavanaugh, a New
York court invalidated a freeze out dissolution. 226 N.Y. at 198, 123 N.E. at 153. The
Kavanaugh court concluded that the majority had breached its fiduciary duties by ordering
the dissolution of a highly profitable corporation without regard to the welfare of the corpora-
tion in order to free the corporation's business from the interference or participation of the
plaintiff minority shareholder. Id. at 192-97, 123 N.E. at 149-51. It has been suggested,
however, that the Kavanaugh merger would have been upheld had an appraisal statute been
in effect, Vorenberg, supra note 2, at 1198 n.32. Moreover, New York cases subsequent to
Kavanaugh and the passage of the appraisal statute have endorsed strongly freeze outs when
an appraisal has been available. See Rubel v. Rubel Corp., 206 N.Y.S.2d 396, 399 (Sup. Ct.
1960)(rights of minority shareholders surrendered subject only to fair and just compensation);
Blumenthal v. Roosevelt Hotel, Inc., 202 Misc.2d 988, 993, 115 N.Y.S.2d 52, 57 (1952); Beloff
v. Consolidated Edison Co., 300 N.Y. 11, 19, 87 N.E.2d 561, 565 (1949)(appraisal exclusive
remedy; minority shareholder has no right to shares in new corporation or to enjoy corpora-
tion's future benefits). But see Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc.2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957,
962 (Sup. Ct. 1976)(merger upheld since there was valid purpose, review of transaction by
independent board, and offer of continued equity interest to minority, but court noted the
likelihood of a breach of the majority's fiduciary duty in long-form merger if there is fraud,
illegality, price manipulation, unfair price or lack of corporate purpose); People v. Concord
Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc.2d 120, 371 N.Y.S.2d 550, 553 (Sup. Ct. 1975)(see note 84 supra).
The U.F.S.-Libby merger also was upheld in federal court against a challenge based on
Rule 10b-5 on the ground that the merger was not designed to promote a legitimate corporate
purpose. Merrit v. Libby, McNeil & Libby, 533 F.2d 1310 (2d Cir. 1976).
91 87 Misc.2d 167, 182, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 483 (1976); Small, supra note 60, at 51-52.
87 Misc.2d 385, 384 N.Y.S.2d 660 (1976).
g Pattern Analysis & Recognition Corp. (PAR) devised a plan of recapitalization which
was designed to eliminate the plaintiffs as minority shareholders. Id. at 386-87, 384 N.Y.S.2d
at 661-62. The plan, executed in strict conformity with N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 801(a),(b)(11)
& 803(a)(McKinney 1963) called for a 4000 to 1 reverse stock split to be followed by a cash
out of the resulting fractional shares as authorized by N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 509 & 513
(McKinney 1963). Since the plaintiffs, former employees of PAR, held less than 4000 shares
of PAR, they would have been deprived of an equity interest in the corporation as a result of
the plan. 87 Misc.2d at 386, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 662.
97 Id. at 386-91, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 662-65. It is generally recognized that obstructionist
minority shareholders motivated by greed alone should not be permitted to foil the legitimate
business interests of the majority. See Tanzer Economic Assocs., Inc. v. Universal Food
Specialties, Inc., 87 Misc.2d 167, 383 N.Y.S.2d 472, 479 (1976); O'NEAL, supra note 5, at §
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majority conceded that the sole purpose of the reorganization was to fur-
ther corporate policies of maintaining only active employee shareholders
and to assure the confidentiality of financial reports. 8 In reaffirming that
minority shareholders should not be relegated to an appraisal remedy, the
court enjoined the transaction on the ground that there was no "strong and
compelling corporate purpose" for the freeze out.9 Whether the Clark court
intended that a "strong and compelling" corporate purpose test be more
difficult to satisfy than a "valid" business purpose test is not clear. Clark
does suggest, however, that the necessity of a freeze out will not be proved
merely by pleading a business purpose.'
In Gabhart v. Gabhart,10° Indiana also adopted a business purpose re-
quirement for freezing out minority shareholders by means of a merger.
Furthermore, the court has made available to dissenting minority share-
holders the infrequently utilized remedy of involuntary dissolution."2 In
211; Kutcher, Freeze Outs of Minority Shareholders in Closely-Held Corporations, 25 LA. B.J.
123, 124, 130 (1977); Winter, supra note 4, at 281.
11 87 Misc.2d at 391, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 665. The court questioned the legitimacy of the
corporation's motives and noted that notwithstanding the reverse stock split, some non-
employees would remain shareholders. Id. Another court also has held that the majority's
desire to limit stock ownership to active employees does not justify a freeze out. See Bryan
v. Brock & Blevins Co.,490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974).
" 87 Misc.2d at 391, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 665. The court's holding was premised on the rule
that controlling shareholders are bound by their fiduciary obligation not to act in bad faith
or in a manner financially detrimental to the minority. Id. at 387-91, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 663-
65. In Clark, the plaintiffs were exposed to irreparable damage due to the potential loss of
their entire investment. Id. at 386, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 661-62.
-' There is considerable lack of agreement among courts and commentators concerning
what constitutes a valid business reason for eliminating minority shareholders. See text
accompanying note 115 infra.
10 370 N.E.2d 345 (Ind. 1977). Gabhart was certified to the Indiana Supreme Court by
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. 545 F.2d 877 (7th Cir. 1977).
102 Courts of equity have long had the discretionary power to order the dissolution of a
corporation, but have exercised the power with great restraint. Note, Dissolution of the Close
Corporation, 41 ST. JoHNs L. Rzv. 239, 248 (1966)[hereinafter cited as Dissolution]. See
generally Comment, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse-Judicial Power to Wind up a Corpora-
tion at the Suit of a Minority Shareholder, 40 COLUM. L. Rav. 220 (1940) [hereinafter cited
as Remedy for Corporate Abuse]. In the leading involuntary dissolution case, Miner v. Belle
Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892), a corporation was ordered dissolved upon a
showing by a minority shareholder that the majority shareholders had breached their trust
obligations by failing to pursue the corporate purpose of profit maximization for all investors.
53 N.W. at 224. Generally, the remedy of involuntary dissolution has been utilized only when
there is an abandonment of corporate function, a failure of corporate purpose, as in Miner,
or a deadlock among shareholders or management. Dissolution, supra at 248-49.
In addition to the inherent power of a court of equity to order dissolution, almost all
states now provide some statutory basis for involuntary dissolution patterned after ABA-ALI
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 9 (1953). Comment, Oppression as a Statutory Ground for Corporate
Dissolution, 1965 DUKE L. REV. 128 (1965)[hereinafter cited as Oppression as Ground for
Dissolution]. These statutes generally provide for dissolution upon proof that the majority
stockholders are engaged in conduct oppressive to the interests of minority shareholders. See,
e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 2107 (Purdon 1967); VA. CoDE § 13.1-94 (1973). Although no clear
standard has evolved for determining the scope of oppressive conduct, see Oppression as
Ground for Dissolution, supra at 135-38; Comment, Corporate Dissolution for Illegal, Oppres-
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Gabhart, majority shareholders in a close corporation, unable to negotiate
a contract for the purchase of the interest of a minority shareholder, cre-
ated a shell corporation in order to eliminate the uncooperative share-
holder through a long-form merger."'3 Although the merger statute did not
expressly require a business purpose for a merger, the Indiana Supreme
Court interpreted the statute as implicitly containing such a require-
ment."'4 The court further noted that the Indiana dissolution statute nei-
ther expressly nor impliedly incorporated a business purpose require-
ment.' 5 Consequently, the court concluded that a merger which promotes
a legitimate business purpose will be upheld and that dissenting share-
holders will be relegated to an appraisal remedy."'" The court held, how-
ever, that a merger that did not advance corporate interests would be
treated as a dissolution, and objecting minority shareholders would be
sive or Fraudulent Acts: The Maryland Solution, 28 MD. L. REV. 360, 368, 372
(1968)[hereinafter cited as Maryland Solution], courts have treated as oppressive corporate
actions devoid of corporate purpose or designed to provide disproportionate benefit to major-
ity shareholders. Oppression as Ground for Dissolution, supra at 130-32. Indiana has no direct
statutory authority permitting dissolution for oppressive majority conduct. Note, Remedies
for Oppression in Close Corporations in Indiana, 41 IND. L.J. 256, 273 (1966) [hereinafter
cited as Remedies in Indiana]. Therefore, the Gabhart court apparently relied on its inherent
equity power in permitting the merger to be challenged as a dissolution.
'1 The corporate defendant, Washington Nursing Center, Inc., was a close corporation
controlled by four shareholder directors, each with 100 shares. The remaining one-fifth inter-
est was owned by the plaintiff, a former director. Unable to enter a contract for the purchase
of the plaintiff's interest, the majority shareholders transferred their shares to a newly-formed
corporation and affected a long form merger pursuant to IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-5-1 to 23-1-
5-6 (Burns 1972). Under the terms of the merger, the plaintiff was required to surrender his
equity interest in the old corporation for debentures in the new corporation. 370 N.E.2d at
349. The plaintiff challenged the validity of the merger on the grounds of fraudulent misrepre-
sentation and lack of business purpose. Id. at 349-50.
0 370 N.E.2d at 355. The application of a business purpose requirement resulted from
the court's conclusion that the principles of contract and agency apply in a merger setting.
Id. at 354-55. Under contract principles, a shareholder is assumed to have notice at the time
of purchase that the terms of his investment may be altered unilaterally by the majority in
accordance with the state merger statute which is incorporated into the corporation's charter.
Norton v. Union Traction Co. of Indiana, 110 N.E. 113, 118-19 (Ind. 1915); see David J.
Greene & Co. v. Schenley Indus. Inc., 281 A.2d 30, 35 (Del. Ch. 1971); Comment, Corporate
Freeze-Outs Effected by Merger: The Search for a Rule, 37 U. Prrr. L. REv. 115, 120 (1975).
The right of the majority to institute corporate reorganization is tempered, however, by
principles of agency which impose a fiduciary duty on controlling shareholders in their deal-
ings with the minority. 370 N.E.2d at 355, citing Lebold v. Inland Steel Co., 125 F.2d 369
(7th Cir. 1941). Previous Indiana cases have not required that mergers promote a corporate
purpose. See, e.g., Apartment Prop., Inc. v. Luley, 252 Ind. 205, 247 N.E.2d 74 (1969); Raff
v. Darrow, 111 N.E. 189, 191 (Ind. 1916).
105 370 N.E.2d at 355, citing IND. CODE ANN. 23-1-7-1 (Bums 1972). Both the merger and
dissolution statutes expressly require only a majority shareholder vote. Since majority share-
holders are always bound by their duty to the minority and since both mergers and dissolu-
tions may result in unfair treatment of minority shareholders, see note 113 infra, there seems
to be no justification for the court's reasoning that the merger statute impliedly required a
business purpose and the dissolution statute did not. Id.
"1 370 N.E.2d at 356. The Gabhart court provided no criteria for determining when a
merger advances corporate interests.
[Vol. XXXV
ASSURING FAIRNESS
entitled to all the benefits of the dissolution statute. 07 In effect, the
Gabhart court has afforded a dissenting minority shareholder the right to
demand the involuntary dissolution of a corporation merged without a
business purpose and to obtain his pro rata share of the liquidated value
of the corporation.0 8 Although the Gabhart approach"9 seems to assure the
equal treatment of shareholders, Gabhart does not afford minority share-
holders the protection of the Delaware approach."' Under Gabhart, once
a business purpose is shown, an Indiana court need not inquire into the
"entire fairness" of the transaction."' Furthermore, under the Singer rule,
Delaware courts will enjoin a merger designed solely to eliminate a minor-
ity shareholder thereby protecting the shareholder's equity interest.,
Under similar circumstances, however, Indiana courts presumably will
permit the freeze out in order to promote corporate flexibility, but will
grant dissenting minority shareholders the protection of a dissolution rem-
edy.1
"I Id. The court reasoned that a frozen out minority shareholder has greater rights under
the dissolution statute than under the appraisal statute since all principles of equity may be
applied in a dissolution proceeding to assure the equal treatment of shareholders. Id.
I" Since the Gabhart court assumed that an appraisal proceeding provides a shareholder
the fair value of his investment, the court in permitting the remedy of involuntary dissolution
indicated that where there is no corporate purpose for a freeze out merger, a minority share-
holder is entitled to all the protection of a dissolution remedy and not just the value of his
investment. The court ignored, however, the possibility that a shareholder may be better off
with an appraisal since the shareholder may suffer a loss in the value of his investment as a
result of a forced judicial sale of the corporation's assets. See Oppression as Ground for
Dissolution, supra note 102, at 139; Maryland Solution, supra note 102, at 364. Furthermore,
a dissolution may be very harmful to a great number of innocent shareholders especially in
the case of a large prosperous corporation, id. at 373-74, and is subject to abuse. In addition,
for a discussion of the problems involved in estimating the value of shares, see authorities
cited at note 33 supra. See text accompanying note 113 infra. See generally Remedy for
Corporate Abuse, supra note 102, at 236-50.
I The Gabhart court's use of involuntary dissolution as a means of contesting a merger
is apparently unique. See sources at note 102, supra.
11 The Gabhart court expressly rejected the Singer rule on the basis that the "entire
fairness" test required scrutiny of every proposed merger and entailed unnecessary judicial
intervention into the corporate decision making process. 370 N.E.2d at 356.
M Id.; see text accompanying note 71 supra.
M See text accompanying notes 48-58.
HI The freeze out of minority shareholders by means of a dissolution is just as objectiona-
ble as any other type of freeze out. See Borden, supra note 2, at 990-93, 1000. Freeze out
dissolutions are particularly inequitable when controlling majority shareholders purchase the
corporation's assets and continue the enterprise through a new corporation absent the partici-
pation of the ousted minority shareholders. Many courts have noted the potential inequities
of a corporate dissolution. See, e.g., Kellogg v. Georgia-Pacific Paper Corp., 227 F. Supp. 719,
723-24 (W.D. Ark. 1964) (dissolution statute does not permit majority to dissolve corporation,
take over the corporate assets, and continue the business since the transaction deprives the
minority of an interest in the business and the attendant possibility of growth and apprecia-
tion in value); Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh, 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919)(see note 93
supra); Theis v. Spokane Falls Gaslight Co., 34 Wash. 23, 74 P. 1004 (1904)(freeze out
dissolution followed by perpetuation of enterprise by majority impermissible under dissolu-
tion statute when there is no corporate reason for depriving minority of continued participa-
tion).
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The recent decisions in Delaware, New York, Indiana, and other
states"' demonstrate that there is increasing judicial concern for assuring
fairness in corporate mergers and for providing minority shareholders rem-
edies to supplement traditional appraisal rights. State courts often have
overemphasized, however, the business purpose test which does not pro-
vide clear guidelines for measuring the propriety of a corporate reorganiza-
tion. ' 5 The proper focus of reviewing courts, as suggested in Singer v.
Magnavox Co. and Kemp v. Angel, should be on the overall fairness of the
merger and not merely the price offered the dissenting shareholders or the
alleged purpose of the transaction."' Unfortunately, the Delaware deci-
sions do not specify methods for assuring fairness."' Thus, Delaware courts
must wrestle with fairness questions on a case by case basis.
As a result of the vagueness of judicial guidelines regulating going pri-
vate transactions and other freeze outs, there is a need for clear statutory
guidelines directing courts in their review of corporate reorganizations."8
Such a statute should enumerate indicia of fairness in transactions in-
tended to eliminate shareholders. The factors bearing on the issue of fair-
ness might include the purpose of the transaction,"' independent non-
'" See note 83 supra.
,, The business purpose test has received mixed reactions from commentators. In sup-
port of the rule, see Brudney, supra note 16, at 1026-39; Kerr, supra note 2, at 58-59; Voren-
berg, supra note 2, at 1204-05. Criticism of the rule has been voiced by Borden, supra note 2,
at 1022-23; Greene, supra note 2, at 500-02; Small, supra note 60, at 52; Chicago Comment,
supra note 18, at 603-04. The basic problem regarding the use of the business purpose test
involves the fact that there is insufficient agreement as to what constitutes a valid business
justification for eliminating minority shareholders. Moreover, the criteria are easy to fabri-
cate, 89 HARv. L. REV. 1917, 1932 (1976), and true corporate motives difficult to ascertain.
Winter, supra note 5, at 281. Among the reasons advanced as business purposes are the
attainment of more prudent management, Business Purpose Test, supra note 4, at 1210,
increased corporate efficiency, Schulwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc.2d 292, 380 N.Y.S.2d 957,
962 (Sup. Ct. 1976), reductions in taxes and financial reporting expenses, id., the elimination
of an obstructionist minority, Kessler, Elimination of Minority Interests by Cash Merger:
Two Recent Cases, 30 Bus. LAW. 699, 710 (1975), and the avoidance of financial collapse. Polin
v. Conduction Corp., 552 F.2d 797, 815-16 (8th Cir. 1977). Motives designated insufficient to
amount to a corporate purpose for a merger include the elimination of managerial discord,
Brudney, supra note 16, at 1032, the elimination of minority shareholders in order to go
private, id., and savings in SEC registration fees. Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 132 N.J.
Super. 35, 342 A.2d 566, 571 n.4 (Ch. Div. 1975). See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
"I See Chirlstein, Sargeant & Lipton, supra note 64, at 304.
"7 See text accompanying notes 52-82 supra.
"I Wisconsin is the only state that has adopted specific going private regulations. See
Wisc. ADM. CODE § 6.05, reprinted in BLUE SKY LAW Rpr. (CCH) 52,606 (1978)(promul-
gated pursuant to WISC. STAT. ANN. § 551 (West 1977)). The Wisconsin regulation requires
that a going private transaction be fair to all holders of equity securities. Fairness is presumed
if the compensation is approved by independent appraisers, the transaction is approved by a
majority of the unaffiliated shareholders, and the compensation afforded the shareholders is
greater than the public offering price unless the latest public offering of securities was more
than ten years prior to the transaction. See Bartell, Minority Stockholder Freeze-outs Under
Wisconsin Law, 33 Bus. LAW. 1501 (1978).
"I See note 115 supra.
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judicial scrutiny of the transaction,' 0 approval of the transaction by im-
partial directors,' acceptance of the. reorganization plan by majority vote
of public shareholders,'2 an offer by the corporation to the minority share-
holders of a continued equity interest,t2 and the availability of warrants
entitling ousted shareholders to repurchase an interest in the corporation
should the corporation reissue public shares in the future.' 4 By providing
courts with standards by which to measure corporate reorganizations, sta-
tutory guidelines will help avoid judicial overemphasis on dubious ele-
ments of corporate purpose and will promote greater certainty in the re-
view of freeze out transactions.'2 Finally, state legislation may be desirable
in order to avert the adoption of rules by the SEC governing going private
transactions which would result in renewed federal intervention in the area





' See Harriman v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 411 F. Supp. 133, 142 (D. Del. 1971),
in which the court viewed favorably the appointment of an independent negotiating commit-
tee to arrange merger terms. See generally Chirelstein, Sergeant & Lipton, supra note 64, at
299-302.
2I See Puma v. Marriot, 283 A.2d 693, 696 (Del. Ch. 1971) (court afforded great deference
to the approval of a corporate transaction by outside, independent directors). See generally
Small, supra note 60, at 64.
n See Chirelstein, Sergeant, & Lipton, supra note 64, at 302. It also has been suggested
that a parent corporation seeking to eliminate minority shareholders in a subsidiary has the
duty to seek out third-party buyers who may offer the minority shareholders greater compen-
sation for their investment. Id. at 290-91.
'2 See discussion of the new California statute at note 23 supra; note 26 supra.
224 See Going Private, supra note 1, at 929-30. Two noteworthy commentators also have
advocated giving ousted minority shareholders a share of the post-merger gains of a corpora-
tion attributable to the shareholders' interest in the pre-merger corporation. See Brudney &
Chirelstein, supra note 18. The Brudney-Chirelstein approach has been criticized, however,
as a "vast seedbed of litigation" due to the speculative nature of attempts to determine future
corporate vlaue. Chirelstein, Sargeant & Lipton, supra note 64, at 285-87.
225 See note 115 supra.
2 Since the Supreme Court in Santa Fe denied minority shareholders a federal fairness
claim based on Rule 10b-5, see text accompanying notes 4-7 supra, there may be increased
demands for major federal legislation governing the shareholder-corporation relationship.
Winter, supra note 4, at 251; see discussion of proposed SEC Rule 13e-3 at note 6 supra.
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